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CHILEAN IMPACT. SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF FIRST ANDERSON STORY BROKE IN ULTIMA HORA THIS AFTERNOON UNDER BANNER HEADLINE.

ITT Papers Show Anti-Allende Role

By JOY ASCHENBACH Star Staff Writer

The giant diversified conglomerate International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. dabled in IIS foreign policy matters in 1970, pressuring government officials to intervene to block the election of Marxist Chilean President Saltedor Allende, according to materials released today by columnist Jack Anderson.

According to these papers, which Anderson identified as the company's own confidential communications, ITT pledged financial support of up to millions of dollars, considered provoking an ecnomic collanse in Chile to trigger a military coup, and contacted the White House, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and Justice Department, in an all out campaign to stop Allende ITT was "ready to see anyone or do anything possible," one paper stated.

Anderson, whose syndicated columns late last month set off the investigation into ITT's links with the Republican convention, yesterday published a column saying that ITT "maneuvered at the highest level to stop the 1970 election of leftist" Allende.

ITT immediately denied that it has ever "intervened or interfered in the internal affairs of Chile in any way," contending that it "has been—and continues to be—a good corporate citizen in Chile..." The CIA and State Department officials declined to comment.

The memoranda released by Anderson today, which run from Sept. 14, 1970, through Nov. 18, 1970, coincide with names, dates and events surrounding Allende's Sept. 4 popular election victory and Oct. 24 congressional election. They provide a blow-by-blow account of extensive efforts to save multimillion-dollar holdings from government seizure.

2 Ex-U.S. Probers Back Life's Charges. Page A-5

TTT, fearing Allende's policy to nationalize corporations, including the Chile Telephone Co. in which it controlled a 60 percent interest, told the office of President Nixon's adviser Henry A. Kissinger that ITT president Harold S. Geneen "was willing to come to Washington to discuss ITT's interest and that we are prepared to assist financially in sums up to seven figures, according to the Sept. 14 memo:

Over the same weekend, the papers show, ITT officials contacted Charles A. Meyer, then assistant secretary of State for

See PAPERS, Page A-12

Latin American affairs, and then Atty. Gen. John Mitchell, apparently in hopes of prodding the White House and State Department, which had been maintaining a hands-off policy on the Chilean election.

Two in Chile

A memo dated Sept. 17 and attributed to two corporation representatives dispatched to Chile, reported that Edward Korry, U.S. ambassador to Chile, "received a message from the State Department giving him the green light to move in the name of President Nixon. The message gave him maximum authority to do all possible—short of a Dominican Republic type action—to keep Allende from taking power."

However, another of the memos released by Anderson—dated one month later—however, described a different policy, stating that former Chilean Brig. Gen. Roberto Viaux, who had been characterized as "gung-ho" for a coup, was told by Washington "to hold back . . and cool it for a later, unspecified date." The Chilean armed forces had been called "a bunch of toy soldiers" by Korry, according to another ITT dispatch.

Meanwhile, the papers show, in the United States in late September, ITT senior vice president Edward J. Gerrity reported to Geneen was he had met with William V. Broo then director of the Lat-American division of the CIA's clandestine services, and discussed Broe's recommendations for bringing about an economic collanse in Chile to force a coup. Later memos reveal ITT rejected the proposal as "unworkable" and that it was unable to muster support for a deliberate economic collapse from other U.S. corporations in Chile.

Although ITT officials con-

tinued to confer with Broe and Korry, who took a hard-line approach to the Allende affair, by mid-October it was increasingly apparent, according to the memos, that there was almost no hope of accomplishing what ITT wanted in Chile. On Oct. 24, Allende received the overwhelming endorsement of the Chilean Congress.

and began bombarding White House and State Department officials with its proposals and "white papers" on what U.S. foreign policy should be for an Allende-controlled Chile, according to the papers.

An Oct. 20 memo entitled "Chile: The Aftermath" and attributed to Gerrity outlined a "broad plan of action . . . to protect us, as best possible, in Chile, and to guard against the inevitable reactions that will occur primarily in Argentina and Brazil."

The State Department was criticized in the same memo, which said that "State has been absolutely wrong on the outcome in Chile ... and will also, based on its record, probably be wrong about the effects of the Allende presidency. We believe State should be pinned down on the record in a written exchange of views so that, in effect, a formal history is set down."

Throughout the series of memos, there are numerous warnings on secrecy, such as, "Every care should be exercised to insure that we (ITT) are not—repeat not—identified openly with any anti-Allende move."

Report on Meeting

An Oct. 22 memo attached to a white paper on how to deal with Allende and attributed to William R. Merriam, head of ITT's Washington office, was addressed to Gerrity about a meeting in which "all of us went over in great detail possible repercussions in Chile if ard when it becomes known that we are pushing the State Department along certain lines. I, personally, feel that we don't have much to lose one way or the other, unless, of course, our so-called 'pressures' come back to haunt us in other Latin American countries. This I also doubt.'

The white paper spelled out approaches that ITT believed Korry should use in meetings with Allende, including a threat to withhold U.S. aid and a reminder about the "economic fear" that hit Chile at the time of the election.

ITT lost the Chile Telephone Co. to Allende. An ITT spokesman in New York said yesterday that the conglomerate continues to operate two Sheraton hotels in Santiago and a telecommunication factory. The spokesman, who denied that Anderson's charges had any foundation in fact, said ITT is negotiating with the Chilean government for compensation for its interest in the telephone company.

spokesman denier interprenee

UPI-99

(ITT) NEW YORK -- A SPOKESMAN FOR INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORP., DESCRIBED TODAY AS "VITHOUT FOUNDATION IN FACT" COLUMNIST JACK ANDERSON'S CLAIM THE COMPANY HAD INTERFERRED IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHILE.

"ITT HAS NEVER INTERVENED OR INTERFERRED IN THE INTERNAL

AFFAIRS OF CHILE IN ANY WAY," THE SPOKESMAN SAID.
"AS A MATTER OF FACT, A CLUSE RADING OF THE ANDERSON COLUMN DISCLOSED HE DOES NOT EVEN MAKE THE ALLEGATION THAT ITT EVER

TOOK ANY SUCH ACTION."
"ON THE CONTRARY," THE SPOKESMAN SAID, "ITT'S COMPANIES IN CHILE HAVE CONTINUED TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN THE CHILEAN

"ITT'S TELECOMMUNICATION FACTORY IN CHILE REMAINS IN OPERATION, FURNISHING MUCH NEEDED EQUIPMENT TO THE CHILEAN TELEPHONE COMPANY. SUPPLIES AND FINANCING FOR THE FACTORY HAVE BEEN MADE CONTINOUSLY AVAILABLE. TOO, SHERATON HOTELS IN SANTIAGO ARE CONTINUING TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHILEAN TOURISM.

"DESPITE THE INTERVENTION OF THE CHILE TELEPHONE COMPANY, ITT

IS CONTINUING TO: PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN CHILE.

"NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS WITH THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING COMPENSATION TO BE PAID FOR ITT'S INTEREST IN THE CHILE COMPANY. MEANWHILE, THE EMPLOYES OF THE CHILE TELEPHONE COMPANY HAVE CONTINUED TO PROVIDE UNINTERRUPTED SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE OF CHILE.

"ITT HAS BEEN -- AND CONTINUES TO BE -- A GOOD CORPORATE CITIZEN IN CHILE, AS WELL AS IN ALL OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE IT HAS

OPERATIONS," THE SPOKESMAN SAID.

3-21--SH110PES

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, March 21, 1972 B13

Memos Bare ITT Try for Chile Coup

By Jack Anderson

Secret documents which escaped shredding by Interna- ITT-CIA Ties tional Telephone and Telegraph show that the company, at the highest levels, maneuvered to stop the 1970 election of leftist Chilean President tial report on Oct. 9, 1970, Salvador Allende.

The papers reveal that ITT dealt regularly with the Central Intelligence Agency and, at one point, considered triggering a military coup to head (CIA), and I summarize for spare parts, etc. off Allende's election.

These documents portray ITT as a virtual corporate nation in itself with vast international holdings, access to Washington's highest officials, place on Oct. 24. its own intelligence apparatus and even its own classification system.

The papers bear a variety of security labels, including "Confidential," "System Confidential," and "Personal and Confidential." The originals, presumably, were shredded along with the "many sacks" tained copies.

They show that ITT officials hoping that everything will were in close touch with William V. Broe, who was then "Also, the Bank of America" mam v. Broe, who was then director of the Latin American division of the CIA's Clandestine Services. They were plotting together to create economic chaos in Chile, thoping this would cause the Chilesen army to will a count of the Chilesen army to will a count of the country o Chilean army to pull a coup The plot to bring about a anti-Allende source in Chile to

from coming to power.

himself a former CIA head, played a role in the bizarre plot. He received a confiden-description of the plot: from William Merriam, vice crepresident in charge of ITT's so. Washington office.

"Today I had lunch with our contact at the McLean agency you the results of our conver-

"Approaches continue to be made to select members of the technical help and should not to have them lead some sort of uprising - no success to in a position to do so should date . . .

"Practically no progress has been made in trying to get provided, and it was suggested American business to cooper- that we approach them as indiate in some way so as to bring of documents that ITT has on economic chaos. GM and the companies involved, ours now admitted destroying to Ford, for example, say that alone had been responsive and keep them out of our hands. they have too much inventory Nevertheless, we have ob on hand in Chile to take any chances and that they keep William Broe) added that hoping that everything will money was not a problem. He

in a confidential telex, dated ress." Sept. 29, 1970, to ITT's Presi-ITT Director John McCone, dent Harold S. Geneen from one of his vice presidents, E. J. Gerrity, Here is Gerrity's

"1. Banks should not renew credit or should delay in doing

"2. Companies should drag their feet in sending money, making deliveries, in shipping

"3. Savings and loan compasation," wrote Merriam. "He is nies there are in trouble. If still very, very pessimistic pressure were applied, they about defeating Allende when would have to shut their umn. the congressional vote takes doors, thereby creating pressure.

"4. We should withdraw all Armed Forces in an attempt promise any technical assistance in the future. Companies close their doors.

"5. A list of companies was cated. I was told that of all understood the problem. The on hand in Chile to take any visitor (evidently the CIA's indicated that certain steps were being taken but that he

that would block Allende | military coup by applying eco- | "keep cool, don't rock the nomic pressure is spelled out boat, we are making prog-

> "This is in direct contrast to what Broe recommended," the memo says. "I will call you later to discuss HSG's (ITT President Harold S. Geneen) reaction to my telex in some detail. He agrees with me that Broe's suggestions are not workable. However, he suggests that we be very discreet in handling Broe."

We will publish further details about this bizarre CIA-ITT conspiracy in a future col-

Footnote: A CIA spokesman would make no comment, refused even to acknowledge Broe's identity We had to verify this from other inside sources. At this writing, ITT hasn't responded to our ques-